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County of Maui, Hawaii v. Hawaii Wildlife Fund,  
140 S. Ct. 1462 (2020) 
 
Rachel L. Wagner 
 
The Supreme Court of the United States was recently asked to 
decide whether the Clean Water Act requires a permit for the discharge of 
pollutants that originate from a point source but are conveyed to navigable 
waters by a nonpoint source. Vacating the Ninth Circuit’s “fairly 
traceable” test, the Court held the Clean Water Act requires a permit when 
there is a direct discharge of pollutants from a point source into navigable 
waters or when there is the “functional equivalent of a direct discharge.” 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In County of Maui, Hawaii v. Hawaii Wildlife Fund,1 the County 
of Maui, Hawaii (“Maui”), raised the question of whether the Clean Water 
Act (“CWA”) requires a permit when pollutants originate from a point 
source—such as the underground injection wells from a sewage treatment 
plant at issue here—but only reach navigable waters after traveling by a 
nonpoint source—here, through groundwater.2 The Supreme Court of the 
United States held that groundwater is subject to regulation under the 
CWA, but in a narrower class of cases than implicated by the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit’s “fairly traceable” test.3 
Specifically, the Court held that a permit is required if the addition of the 
pollutant through groundwater is the “functional equivalent of a direct 
discharge” from the point source into navigable waters.4  
The Court vacated and remanded the Ninth Circuit’s decision, but 
also abrogated two other circuit court decisions involving groundwater 
pollution: (1) Upstate Forever v. Kinder Morgan Energy Partners LP, 887 
F.3d 637 (4th Cir. 2018), in which the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Fourth Circuit applied the CWA based on a “direct hydrological 
connection” between groundwater and navigable water; and (2) Kentucky 
Waterways Alliance v. Kentucky Utilities Co., 905 F.3d 925 (6th Cir. 
2018), in which the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit 
held the CWA does not apply to indirect discharges.5 In vacating these 
decisions, the Court created a new test for determining the kind of point 
source discharges conveyed to navigable waters that require a permit 
under the CWA.  
 
1. 140 S. Ct. 1462 (2020).  
2. Id. at 1468. 
3. Id. 
4. Id. 
5. Id. at 1469–70. 
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II.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
Maui operates a wastewater treatment facility near Lahaina on the 
Island of Maui, Hawaii.6 The facility receives sewage from the area, 
partially treats it, then releases the effluent (or “wastewater”) through four 
on-site injection wells.7 The wastewater travels hundreds of feet 
underground into the groundwater aquifer, then travels another half mile 
through groundwater to the Pacific Ocean.8  
The CWA establishes the basic structure for regulating discharges 
of pollutants into the waters of the United States, and prohibits the 
“addition” of a pollutant from a “point source” to “navigable waters” 
without a permit from the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”).9 In 
2012, numerous environmental groups (“Respondents”) sued Maui in the 
United States District Court for the District of Hawaii under the CWA’s 
citizen suit provision, alleging the CWA required a permit because Maui 
was “‘discharg[ing]’ a ‘pollutant’ to ‘navigable waters’”10 Maui moved to 
dismiss the case, asserting the CWA did not cover the pollutants because 
they passed through groundwater––a nonpoint source––before entering 
navigable waters.11 To reach its decision, the district court relied 
extensively on a tracer dye study conducted by the EPA and the Hawaii 
Department of Health and granted summary judgment for the 
Respondents.12 The district court reasoned that because the “path to the 
ocean [was] clearly ascertainable,” the discharge from the injection wells 
into the groundwater was “functionally one into navigable water.”13  
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision that Maui 
was required to obtain a permit from the EPA but applied a different legal 
test. The Ninth Circuit held that a permit is required when “the pollutants 
are fairly traceable from the point source to a navigable water such that the 
discharge is the functional equivalent of a discharge into a navigable 
water.”14 The Ninth Circuit, however, did not address when a 
hydrogeologic connection between a point source and a navigable water is 
“too tenuous to support liability” under the CWA.15 
Maui petitioned for certiorari.16 Because the Supreme Court 
sought to resolve the conflict between the Ninth Circuit’s “fairly 
traceable” test, the Fourth Circuit’s “direct hydrological connection” test, 
 
6. Id. at 1469. 
7. Id.   
8. Id.   
9. Id. at 1468.  
10. Id. 
11. Id. at 1469 (citing Hawai’i Wildlife Fund v. Cty. Of Maui, 24 
F.Supp.3d 980, 998 (D. Haw. 2014)). 
12. Id. 
13. Id. at 1469 (quoting Hawai’i Wildlife Fund v. Cty. of Maui, 24 
F.Supp.3d 980, 998 (D. Haw. 2014)).  
14. Id. (quoting Hawai’i Wildlife Fund v. Cty. of Maui, 886 F.3d 737, 
749 (9th Cir. 2018)).  
15. Id. at 1469.  
16. Id.  
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and the Sixth Circuit’s broad conclusion that discharges through 
groundwater are categorically excluded from the CWA’s permitting 
requirements, it granted Maui’s petition.17 
III.  ANALYSIS 
This case hinged on the scope of the statutory word “from.” In a 
6–3 decision, the majority first addressed whether pollution that reaches 
navigable waters through groundwater is “from” a point source as defined 
by the CWA.18 The Court found the Respondents’ and Ninth Circuit’s 
“fairly traceable” test overinclusive, and Maui’s “means of delivery” test 
and categorical exclusion of groundwater from the CWA’s permitting 
requirement by the Solicitor General as amicus curiae underinclusive.19 
Instead, the Court concluded the CWA requires a permit when a point 
source of pollution adds pollutants to navigable water through 
groundwater, if the addition of pollutants is “the functional equivalent of 
a direct discharge” from the source into navigable waters.20 
A.  The Ninth Circuit’s “Fairly Traceable” Test Is Overinclusive 
Looking to the context, structure, and history of the CWA, the 
Court rejected the Ninth Circuit’s test––that a permit is required so long 
as the pollutant is “fairly traceable” to a point source regardless of the 
distance it traveled before reaching navigable waters.21  
The Court stressed the importance of advancing congressional 
intent and turned first to context to interpret the CWA’s statutory 
objectives. To interpret “from” in the context of the phrase “from any point 
source” would require a permit in absurd circumstances, such as “for 
pollutants carried to navigable waters on a bird’s feathers, or, to mention 
more mundane instances, the 100-year migration of pollutants through 250 
miles of groundwater to a river.”22 Thus, the Court did not think this literal 
interpretation of the word “from” conformed with Congress’s intent when 
it established the CWA.23  
The Court also looked to the structure of the CWA to point out 
that the statute expressly grants some authority to the EPA to regulate 
point source pollutants, but is silent about nonpoint source regulation.24 
Consequently, because the EPA’s role in managing groundwater pollution 
is limited to collecting from and sharing information with the states, the 
Court did not think Congress intended the EPA to interfere with the states’ 
 
17. Id.  
18. Id. at 1470.  
19. Id.  
20. Id. at 1477. 
21. Id. at 1470.  
22. Id. at 1471. 
23. Id.  
24. Id. at 1471.  
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authority to regulate groundwater and nonpoint source pollution.25 
Further, the legislative history of the CWA indicated that Congress 
rejected prior requests for general EPA permitting authority over 
groundwater.26  
Finally, the historical practices of the EPA’s permitting 
requirement––a much narrower and administratively workable “direct 
hydrological connection” test––supports the Court’s view that Congress 
did not intend for the EPA to have broad regulatory authority like the Ninth 
Circuit’s test would enable.27 Therefore, the Court concluded the Ninth 
Circuit’s “fairly traceable” test was overinclusive and did not think the 
EPA should be able to assert its permitting authority over the release of 
pollutants that reach “navigable waters, possibly many years after their 
release and in highly diluted forms.”28   
B.  Maui’s “Means-Of-Delivery” Test Is Underinclusive 
Rejecting Maui’s “means-of-delivery” test, the Court dismissed 
Maui’s assertion that a permit is only required if a point source ultimately 
delivers the pollutant directly into navigable waters.29 Again, the Court 
based its decision on its analysis of the context of the CWA and 
congressional intent.30  
Maui, with the support of the Solicitor General, argued the 
language of the CWA only requires a permit for a “discharge,” which in 
this context is defined as “‘any addition’ of a pollutant to navigable waters 
‘from any point source.’”31 Maui asserted that the meaning of “from any 
point source” did not concern from where the pollution initiated, but only 
the manner in which it got there.”32 If a pollutant moves through 
groundwater to navigable waters, Maui argued, then it is the groundwater 
that is the conveyance, not the point source.33 
The Court, however, looked to the ordinary meaning of the 
CWA’s statutory language to ascertain congressional intent. The Court 
expressed serious concern that Maui’s interpretation would create an 
unintended loophole in the EPA’s permitting requirement.34 Accordingly, 
the Court determined that because the statute pairs the word “from” with 
the word “to,” Congress intended “navigable water” as a destination, and 
“any point source” as an origin.35  
 
25. Id.   
26. Id. at 1472.  
27. Id. at 1472–73.  
28. Id.   
29. Id. at 1473.  
30. Id.  
31. Id. at 1473–74. 
32. Id. at 1473.  
33. Id.  
34. Id. at 1474.  
35. Id.  
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The Court next turned to the argument proposed by the Solicitor 
General––that the proper interpretation of the CWA is reflected in the 
EPA’s recently published Interpretive Statement, categorically excluding 
all releases of pollutants to groundwater from the permitting 
requirement.36 The Court pointed out that neither party, nor the Solicitor 
General, asked for what the Court has referred to as Chevron deference to 
the EPA’s Interpretive Statement.37 Moreover, the Court did not find the 
EPA’s Interpretative Statement persuasive or reasonable in light of the 
essential purpose of the statute.38 The Court rejected this interpretation of 
the CWA because it would “open a loophole,” thus enabling 
circumvention of the essential purpose of the statute.39 
Finally, the Court addressed the two dissenting opinions, and 
rejected the dissents’ suggestions that the language of the statute could be 
narrowed by reading it to refer only to the pollutant’s immediate origin.40 
Through an extensive linguistic analysis of the statute, the Court explained 
that the correct reading of the statute turns on context.41 Comparing the 
present case to Rapanos v. United States,42 “the statute here does not say 
‘directly’ from or ‘immediately’ from.”43 The Court pointed out that in 
Rapanos, Justice Scalia reasoned that the CWA does not “forbid the 
‘addition of any pollutant directly to navigable waters from any point 
source,’ but rather the ‘addition of any pollutant to navigable waters.’”44 
Therefore, as the Court held in Rapanos and restated in County of Maui, 
pollutants discharged from a point source and conveyed through an 
indirect means into navigable waters are not exempt from the CWA’s 
permitting requirement. 45  
C.  The Court’s “Functional Equivalence” Test 
Ultimately, the Court concluded that “in light of the [CWA’s] 
language, structure, and purposes,” a permit is required when there is a 
“direct discharge from a point source into navigable waters or when there 
is the functional equivalent of a direct discharge.”46 The Court emphasized 
several factors that may be relevant to determining whether a particular 
discharge is the functional equivalent of one directly into navigable water, 
with time and distance being the most important factors in most cases.47 
The relevant factors may include: (1) transit time; (2) distance traveled; 
 
36. Id.  
37. Id.  
38. Id. at 1474–75.  
39. Id. at 1474.  
40. Id. at 1475 (citing Thomas, J., dissenting). 
41. Id. (majority opinion). 
42. 547 U.S. 715 (2006).  
43. County of Maui, Hawaii, 140 S. Ct. at 1475.  
44. Id. at 1477.  
45. Id. at 1478.  
46. Id. at 1476 (emphasis in original).  
47. Id.  
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(3) the nature of the material through which the pollutant travels; (4) the 
extent to which the pollutant is diluted or chemically changed as it travels; 
(5) the amount of pollutant entering the navigable waters relative to the 
amount of the pollutant that leaves the point source; (6) the manner by or 
area in which the pollutant enters the navigable waters; and (7) the degree 
to which the pollution (at that point) has maintained its specific identity.48 
According to the Court, this test reflects the “complexities inherent to the 
context of indirect discharges through groundwater” and allows district 
judges to use their discretion on a case by case basis.49 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
County of Maui, Hawaii v. Hawaii Wildlife Fund settled the divide 
between federal circuit courts as to whether the CWA applies to pollutants 
discharged into groundwater that subsequently migrate into navigable 
surface water bodies. However, the “functional equivalence” standard 
County of Maui imposes requires significant factual analysis, which will 
likely require clarification in future decisions. Because of this lingering 
ambiguity, exactly how far the protections afforded by the CWA will reach 
remains uncertain.  
 
48. Id. at 1476–77.  
49. Id. at 1477. 
